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Shunning cases page 2
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[DHWH1]Guinn v. The Church of Collingsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989), stands for two propositions: a church can discipline its members without fear of judicial intervention only while the person remains a member, and individuals may terminate their membership without regard to what the church's rules may provide.
Since Guinn, the courts have followed the Oklahoma Supreme Court and held that "a church can discipline individuals without fear of judicial intervention" only while "the complaining individual was a member at the time of the disciplinary action." Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, — N.W.2d — , 1998 WL 842259 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). As the Michigan Court of Appeals framed the rule: "Where the plaintiff is a member of the church at the time of the defendant church's alleged tortious activity . . . 'the church has authority to prescribe and follow disciplinary ordinances without fear of interference by the state.'" Smith, supra (quoting Guinn, 775 P.2d at 773–774; and citing Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 987–88 (Okla. 1992); see also Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 559-560 (Mo. 1987) (if plaintiffs were members of the church, "they presumptively consented to religiously motivated discipline practiced in good faith"). But this absolute privilege from judicial intervention applies only if the discipline "does not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." Guinn, 775 P.2d at 779.
In Guinn the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that once the individual's relationship with the church has been terminated, either by the individual or the church, the free–exercise clause no longer shields the church from civil liability. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 783–84. While Guinn suggests that an individual may voluntarily waive or give up his or her right to withdraw from association with a church, the court in Guinn was not presented with that situation. Since Guinn, the cases suggest that the courts may uphold an absolute right to unilaterally withdraw from association with a church. E.g., Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 988 ("On the other hand, no citizen of the state may be compelled to remain in a church which his conscience impels him to leave.") If presented squarely with the issue, the courts may very well hold that the right to disassociate from a church cannot be waived.
Even after the member terminates his or her membership, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the church may complete the disciplinary process. Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 989–90 (Okla. 1992). In this situation, however, the absolute privilege may no longer apply:
In the event of withdrawal or of post-excommunication activity unrelated to the church's efforts at effectuation of valid judicature, the absolute privilege from tort liability no longer attaches. Any action at this point, if it is to be protected, must be justified by others means. Under these circumstances conditional privileges may be applicable. The church may take such steps as are reasonable to protect itself and to complete the process occasioned by the withdrawal or other termination of the consensual relationship with a member. Guinn, supra at 775-782; Hester, supra at 559-560; cf. Hadnot, supra at 987-988.
In such situations, a privilege may apply to activities or communications after termination of membership "if these may be termed as mere implementation of previously pronounced ecclesiastical sanction which was valid when exercised." Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 987. Thus, completing the disciplinary process exposes the church and individuals to civil liability. Any actions after the person leaves the church should be carefully considered, perhaps after consultation with an attorney.
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