NHL Hockey: The Game you never knew
Hockey: The Game You Never Knew (page 1)
I chanced upon a book by Jeff Klein and Karl Reif, The Death of Hockey, offering a fan’s perspective at the sad state of professional hockey. Seething at the high cost of tickets, players making millions, fewer goals and too many teams, this was their chance to vent their frustration at a game that had somehow forgotten the fan. What happened to exciting teams like the Oilers and Canadiens and the days when the boards were free of advertisements? Why had Canadian teams found winning Lord Stanley’s cup so difficult? Why were players so much bigger and what happened to the 50-goal scorers? The answers, as I discovered would not be found so much on the ice, as they would be off.
To better understand, I ventured back to a time when hockey was a different game. In fact, up until the 1930’s hockey was an on-side game. Like rugby, forward passes were not allowed. To advance into the opposition’s end, players had the difficult task of either stick handling through a maze of men or going around them. Often, players simply dropped back a pass to open men who again tried to break through the defense. As a result, hockey became an essentially straight-ahead, up and down game. As puck carriers advanced, defenders simply blocked their path. Having few options, play often turned into a scrum. Though moving through defenses was difficult, goals were scored and a few skilled players like Joe Malone scored in large numbers.
This changed however, in the 1920’s as the NHL expanded from 4 to 10 teams. With too few players to stock new teams, lesser skilled players were recruited to fill the void. Naturally, scoring dropped as a diluted talent pool and hockey’s congested mind-set made scoring difficult for all but its best players. By the late 1920’s, an average of 3 goals were being scored per game.
To rejuvenate fan interest, the NHL decided to introduce forward passing in 1929 in the hopes that goal production would rise. By the following season, scoring had doubled bringing more excitement and stability to the league.
More goals however, necessitated new tactics. Though forechecking had played a small role prior to 1929, it proved to be an effective defense against the pass. If a forechecker could force the puck carrier to turn over the puck, a goal scoring opportunity might result or the puck carrier might find himself bogged down in a scrum for the puck. To relieve the pressure, puck carriers often simply shot the puck up ice for their teammates to chase after. Though this worked, it was far from ideal. Playmaking suffered and defenders could easily predict an attacker’s next move.
By 1942, the NHL once again found itself in a quandary as players abandoned hockey for the war effort. With many of its marquee players gone, goal scoring again suffered. Frustrated by too little scoring, the NHL added a center red line in hopes that the additional passing room would lead to more playmaking and more scoring. Though goal scoring did rise, few if any of the old habits changed. Defenses continued to stand up at the blueline, bodycheck and crowd the puck carrier. Offenses simply continued to advance in predictable straight patterns, just faster. As hockey sped up, it turned into a hyperactive game. Ken Dryden wrote, “It was speed unaccommodated, never allowed to work, because the playing patterns, skills and attitudes of the game were never adjusted to make it work.”
Not until the Summit series of 1972 would we garner a glimpse into the different possibilities of our game. From long passes from deep within their zone to criss-crossing patterns, the Russians were playing a game that emphasized puck control, skating and quick passes rather than chasing the puck, emotions and intimidation. The Russians made the transitions from defense to offense particularly well. When combined with good conditioning, the Russians were often one step ahead.
The question begging to be asked was how could a country with less than 25 years of experience nearly defeat our pros? The answer could be found in timing and culture. Hockey in the Soviet Union took hold in the late 1940’s. With the redline already established and the onside game a thing of the past, the Soviets were starting with a fresh slate. Separated by distance and culture, they developed a game rooted in their own sporting traditions such as bandy and soccer. What they arrived at was a game premised on puck control, team play and speed, which often led to open men and more scoring. To solidify their strategies, they placed a high level of importance on fitness and skill development. This, combined with shorter shifts and quick passes, super-charged their game giving Team Canada the appearance of a team arriving from the geriatric ward.
Though Team Canada suffered the label as a team out of shape, the truth was that the Russian style of quick passes simply caused the Canadian players to tire-out quickly. Criticized for their lack of effort, Phil Esposito could bear the boos from the fans no longer. After game four in Vancouver he lashed out. Team Canada was giving everything it had.
Overwhelmed, Team Canada fell behind the Russian’s. Unable to rise above the Soviet offensive might, Team Canada switched tactics in mid-stride. Tight checking, physical play and intimidation became the tools of choice. Though Canada’s one-goal margin of victory should have had coaches running to the drawing board, winning by the narrowest of margins had vindicated our system. Our salvation: a fortuitous goal that could at best be described as good fortune. For the rest of the Seventies and early Eighties, the Russians dominated all but our best teams. Though Canada won the occasional game and tournament, to our chagrin, the Russians were playing our game better and winning.
It would take another eight years before Wayne Gretzky and the Edmonton Oilers would adopt what no other NHL teams would. Why this was the case, likely had more to with inflexible thinking and a lack of will to adopt a system that was unproven in Canada. The Oilers on the other hand begun the 1979 season decimated by the merger of the WHA into the NHL. With few veterans or stars and little to lose, they took a risk on young players who would be more receptive to playing an innovative team approach. Herb Brook’s for one understood this when his very young team of amateurs defeated the Soviets at the 1980 winter olympics. This was essentially the same Soviet team that had only one year before beat a team of NHL all-stars. Foregoing better players, Brook’s held on to those who would commit to a team game premised closely on the Soviet style.
By 1981, the Oiler game plan was succeeding beyond anyone’s expectations. Possessing an abundance of young talent with great speed and a team attitude, the Edmonton Oilers were well on their way to becoming one of the all-time offensive powers. During the 80’s, they established many new scoring records both as individuals and as a team. Though they did not entirely abandon the traditional tactics of our game, the Oilers had combined speed, quick passing and playmaking into a mix that would dominate the NHL for nearly a decade.
As the Oiler chapter began to fade, the NHL underwent a transformation of unparalleled proportions. In a span of ten years, the NHL went from 21 to 30 teams creating a frenzy for marquee players. Salaries went up and then exploded.
Facing a shortage of talented players to fill rosters, teams began looking more and more at Europeans. With the collapse of communism, many highly skilled players from all over Europe were drafted into the NHL. In 1990, Europeans made up less than 10% of the league. By 2003, that number was 30%. Canadians, who once dominated, now accounted for only half the league. Even so, there were not enough skilled players for 30 teams. Following the 1994/95 lockout, a bidding war for the leagues best ensued. Owners with deep pockets and a fear of losing their premier players paid anything. Expansion had backfired. What had initially been a cash grab for expansion money had tuned into a far more costly venture as competition for top-notch players sent salaries soaring.
This presented a sizeable challenge particularly for new franchises, many of which were located in non-traditional hockey cities like Tampa Bay, Atlanta and Anaheim. Not only were they starting anew, hockey had a small following in America’s Sunbelt where competition from other major league sports was well entrenched. Teams found themselves in a losing battle. Either pay the outrageous salaries to keep fans coming back or remain uncompetitive. Unknowingly, owners had created a lose-lose scenario for themselves. Winning was essential if teams were to draw crowds and ensure long-term stability.
Canadian teams, on the other hand, were disadvantaged to their American counterparts. With a weaker dollar, higher taxes and a smaller population base, Canadian teams had to seek out new sources of income or ask fans to dig deeper. Paying salaries in US dollars didn’t help either. Canadian teams would have to either sacrifice profits or forego better players. Canadian teams seized upon the one advantage they had over the US. Hockey was woven within it’s very social fabric. Long winters, a lengthy tradition, considerable media attention and the home to many players attracted a strong following. To many Canadians, hockey was not merely a sport; it was a way of life. Though Canadians stood by their teams, escalating salaries had forced two teams to move to the US while three others came within a hair of the same fate.
As salaries soared, teams sought-out new sources of revenue. Attracting support from the business community became a priority. Teams constructed box seats while corporate sponsorships were sought out creating a strong business presence. Names like the Gardens, the forum and the Coliseum gave way to names like the Office Depot Center, Rexall Place and Continental Airlines Arena. Individual and family ownership gave way to more corporate ownership. Teams directed ticket sales at corporations and businesses with deep pockets and access to tax write-downs. TV revenue increased as specialty sport channels began broadcasting games, though network TV remained elusive. Licensing agreements were struck and a slew of new products appeared from toy figurines to third jerseys and other collectibles. Even advertizing, once considered taboo, appeared along the boards in 1990. Even with these additional sources of revenue, some small market franchises could not keep up. Teams in Winnipeg, Hartford and Minnesota were forced to relocate.
Unfortunately, this business trend only served to further alienate the average fan who either had to pay more, sit in the cheap seats or watch on T.V. Hockey was no longer a family event. No longer affordable to the average fan. Hockey was big business.
On the ice, teams with smaller budgets had to find other ways to compete without marquee players. Just as teams had done in the 1920’s, many of today’s teams were emphasizing defense, but in some innovative ways. During the 1990’s, goaltending underwent a transformation as bigger men, bigger equipment and better training methods made scoring appreciably more difficult. New defensive systems like the neutral zone trap were introduced, but ever more daunting was how much faster the game became. Though hockey was a fast sport to begin with, teams found ways to cover more ice as attitudes changed in the 1990’s. Borrowing from the Soviets, NHL teams were finally adopting many of the tactics first seen in 1972. Speed became as important to defenses as it had been to offenses. Shorter shifts, increasing levels of fitness, better equipment and a change in attitude had supercharged the game.
Speed became particularly invaluable to defenders who discovered that a combination of speed and checking could hamper attacking players. Though coaches had known for years that aggressive forechecking could slow down attackers and reduce goals, integrating an effective offensive game into a tight defensive game had not yet been consistently achieved. Not till the late 1990’s did defensive systems become reliable enough to ensure that scoring 2 or 3 goals could win games consistently. THIS IS WHY TALK TO INSTILL MORE OFFENSE INTO THE GAME IS FUTILE. Though fans wish it and the league ponders it, opening the game up would tip the scales back in favor of the most skilled teams. Naturally, these are also the wealthiest teams. Poorer teams with average players would be relegated to the cellar year after year. Without spending controls or more income, these teams would likely face capitulation or relocation thus creating instability and upheaval within the league. Defense wasn’t just about winning, it was about survival on and off the ice.
The advantage that faster players of yesteryear had enjoyed was gone. The league’s motto, “The fastest game on earth” may have sounded alluring, but to my surprise, speed was driving down scores and debilitating offenses. Even the open style of the Russians or the Edmonton Oilers who had found great success employing fast breakouts from their own zone, quick passes, wingers in motion and criss-crossing patterns were no longer as effective. Formidable defenses had successfully reduced the size of the playing field. With little time and space to maneuver, offences often found themselves bogged down. The days of two-on-ones and rushing defenseman were over.
Teams that could limit their opponents to one or two goals a game might only need two or three to tie or win. This meant no longer did they require the high priced, high skilled players that were sought after by the wealthier teams to score goals. A hot goalie, tremendous desire and a couple of goal scorers could beat most any team. Just ask the Calgary Flames or the Anaheim Mighty Ducks. Though they had triumphed over some talented teams, winning the Stanley Cup still remained the domain of the elite.
To combat stifling defenses, many teams sought out other means to beat modern defenses. They worked harder, passed more and pushed themselves and the game to its limits, but to no avail. With little room to maneuver and aggressive forechecking, the game continued to break down. Though hockey had always been a game of transition, coordinating an attack at breakneck speed was just as much an impediment as any defense opposing it. The quicker players moved the more apt they were to make a mistake. This created more breakdowns resulting in more congestion and stoppages in play. (Cont. Go to the top to link up page 2.
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